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The Coal Strike Panama Philippines and Cuba

BY

Joseph Bucklin Bishop

Author of "Our Political Drama," "Cheap Money
Experiments," Etc.

Reprinted from

"The International Quarterly"

NEW YORK
SCOTT-THAW COMPANY

542 Fifth Avenue

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ISSUES OF A NEW EPOCH.

THE COAL STRIKE.

THE anthracite coal strike which was ended through the intervention of the President in October, 1903, was not only the most serious contest of the kind this country has ever known, but the most serious that the world has known. Other strikes have involved a larger number of men and have entailed nearly or quite as much financial loss, but none has affected the people of the entire country to anything like the extent which this one did, simply because none stopped the production of what has come to be regarded as a necessity of life. Of course anthracite is not an absolute necessity of life. If the supply were to be exhausted this year, substitutes for it as fuel would be found. The world would have to learn to get on without it; but so long as people regard it as a necessity, and so long as they know it exists and can be obtained, they will not submit to having the supply cut off without protest, more or less violent, according to their needs and sufferings. That virtually all the people did believe in October, 1903, that anthracite was a necessity both to their comfort and their health, is not to be questioned. They believed it so implicitly that nothing which could be said to the contrary had any appreciable effect upon them. Their conviction was so strong that the mere threat of a coal famine sent a panicky feeling throughout every large city in the land. In the country districts a sufficient supply of wood could be obtained, but in the cities there was little or no hope of doing so. Bituminous coal was an insufficient substitute because nearly all existing heating apparatus was not adapted to its use. Without anthracite, every household in a large city was threatened with discomfort and peril. It came about, therefore, that the whole population had an intense personal interest in the strike based upon two very strong reasons—first, danger to their individual

well-being; and, second, a heavy tax upon their resources to meet the higher cost of fuel of any kind.

As weeks and months went by with one promise of settlement after another proving a delusion, and with cold weather at hand, this panicky feeling increased until it became a menace to the public safety. For five months the mines had been idle, and while the coal operators declared that there was no danger of a coal famine, it was within the knowledge of every householder that the famine was already in sight. It was only with extreme difficulty that a single ton of coal could be obtained in New York and other large cities by a small consumer, and every householder who had neglected to put in his winter's supply in the spring found it impossible to obtain it except in small quantities and at steadily rising prices. Many dealers refused to take orders and most of them were entirely without a supply. In the presence of a condition like this it was worse than foolish for the mine owners to persist in their statement, as they did daily, that there was no scarcity, for their denial of what everybody knew to be the actual fact served to arouse popular distrust of them and to aggravate rather than to quiet the general uneasiness. It was almost maddening to tell thousands of people who had been trying in vain for days and weeks to get coal that there was plenty of coal to be had and they were foolish to think there was not.

When all efforts to bring about a settlement had failed, when the state of Pennsylvania had shown itself powerless to even maintain order in the coal region, it was natural for the people of the country to turn to the Federal government for aid. This they began to do early in October, when the approach of cold weather sent a thrill of alarm throughout the land. Appeals to President Roosevelt began to pour in from all quarters, both from individuals and from persons in authority. Governor Crane of Massachusetts, Mayor Low of New York City, and the heads of municipal governments generally besought the President to use his good offices in some way to bring about an adjustment in order that the imminent peril of suffering and riot might be warded from the land. The President could not be deaf to such appeals. No president that the country has ever had could have been, for not only the comfort and lives of countless numbers of people were threatened, but stability and lawful government, and millions in property were at stake in every city of the land. The President had no authority in law and no precedent to sustain him. He was fully aware of this and he succeeded by never losing sight of the fact that he had neither. No task that he had

undertaken previously had involved so large an element of political risk as this did. It was an entirely new departure. Nothing like it had ever been done by a president. The great body of conservative opinion in the country had serious doubts about either the wisdom or the justification of the step. He felt moved to act because of the great public need and great public peril involved, and he could not escape the conviction that it was a matter of simple duty for him, as the people's president, to exert all the moral influence he had in the interest of the people. Criticism did not affect him at all, no matter what its source, once he had made up his mind. He did not count the chances of success or failure, and when he was told, as he was repeatedly, that failure would ruin him politically, he went steadily and fearlessly ahead. While both sides to the quarrel repulsed his first efforts and refused to step up to the high ground of public welfare upon which he stood and to which he invited them, he persevered in his appeals to them till both came in the end, if not willingly, at least with recognition of the fact that he had offered to them a way out without surrender. He succeeded in this, as he succeeded in all other like endeavors, by being open and straightforward in all his proceedings. He had no hidden end to serve; he leaned neither to one side nor to the other, but said simply, "I offer you my services as mediator in order that this contest which so seriously threatens the welfare and the peace of the whole country may be brought to an end." His obvious sincerity and singleness of purpose so impressed the whole country and, indeed, the whole world, that the contending forces were fairly compelled to yield to his proposals. The chorus of praise which arose from all quarters of the land, and from all the leading countries of Europe, when success was recorded, was something that no other president had received. He himself was unable to comprehend it and thought it undeserved. When it was spoken of in his presence, he said to his intimate friends, "I am being very much over-praised by everybody. I do not deserve it. It really seems to me that any man of average courage and common sense, who felt as deeply as I did the terrible calamity impending over our people, would have done just what I did."

He was not the only person in the land who felt the gravity of the situation. It has been charged and is still charged by his critics that he did what no other president before him had done and what few of them would have consented to do. It is no longer a secret that in all that he did he had the hearty approval and

sympathy of ex-President Cleveland. Early in his efforts to bring about peace between the mine operators and the miners, Mr. Cleveland took occasion to express his complete accord with him. On the day following the first meeting before the President, at Washington, of the operators and representatives of the strikers, which failed because of the refusal of the operators to consent to a commission of arbitration, Mr. Cleveland wrote to the President a letter which in addition to expressing approval of the President's course, and some righteous indignation at the obstinacy of the contestants, contained suggestions for a plan of settlement, and gave as a reason for volunteering his views that his doing so would at least "serve as an indication of the anxiety felt by millions of our citizens on the subject." The only living ex-President, and the only Democratic President that the country has had since the civil war, thus joined hands with the Republican President in believing that a crisis had arisen which was so grave as to justify extraordinary action by the Executive of the nation. It is also no longer a secret, that after receiving this letter from Mr. Cleveland, President Roosevelt asked him if he would consent to be a member of a commission of settlement and that Mr. Cleveland replied in the affirmative. This acceptance persuaded the President to appoint a commission without the consent of the operators, in case they continued in their refusal to give it, and he proceeded to choose the members of it, with Mr. Cleveland as the first. The men whom he selected were mainly those subsequently appointed, but when the operators and their financial associates heard of the President's purpose and heard also of Mr. Cleveland's selection as member of the commission, they made haste to give their consent to the plan of arbitration, but protested vigorously against the selection of Mr. Cleveland. They realized keenly enough what the moral effect would be upon the country of having it appear that the only living ex-President, who was also the most eminent Democrat in the land, stood shoulder to shoulder with President Roosevelt in what he had done and proposed to do. That would have ended the "Constitutional" objection to Roosevelt's course at once and forever.

But if the operators would not permit Mr. Cleveland to serve on the commission, they did allow the President to appoint to it a Democrat who indisputably ranks next to Mr. Cleveland in ability and character, and in reputation for sound Constitutional construction, when they consented to the choice of Judge George Gray of Delaware. His approval of the President's course, ex-

pressed after he had conducted the inquiry to a successful conclusion, should be a sufficient answer to the criticisms which are made of the President's course. In an interview which was published in the New York "World," on September 1, 1903, Judge Gray said:

"I have no hesitation in saying that the President of the United States was confronted in October, 1902, by the existence of a crisis more grave and threatening than any that had occurred since the civil war. I mean that the cessation of mining in the anthracite country, brought about by the dispute between the miners and those who controlled the greatest natural monopoly in this country and perhaps in the world, had brought upon more than one-half of the American people a condition of deprivation of one of the necessities of life, and the probable continuance of the dispute threatened not only the comfort and health, but the safety and good order, of the nation. He was without legal or constitutional power to interfere, but his position as President of the United States gave him an influence, a leadership, as first citizen of the republic, that enabled him to appeal to the patriotism and good sense of the parties to the controversy and to place upon them the moral coercion of public opinion to agree to an arbitrament of the strike then existing and threatening consequences so direful to the whole country. He acted promptly and courageously, and in so doing averted the dangers to which I have alluded.

"So far from interfering or infringing upon property rights, the President's action tended to conserve them. The peculiar situation, as regards the anthracite coal interest, was that they controlled a natural monopoly of a product necessary to the comfort and to the very life of a large portion of the people. A prolonged deprivation of the enjoyment of this necessary of life would have tended to precipitate an attack upon these property rights of which you speak: for, after all, it is vain to deny that this property, so peculiar in its conditions, and which is properly spoken of as a natural monopoly, is affected with a public interest.

"I do not think that any president ever acted more wisely, courageously, or promptly in a national crisis. Mr. Roosevelt deserves unstinted praise for what he did."

It has always been contended by the President's critics that if he had not intervened the strikers would have surrendered in a very short time. Those who make this assertion overlook, in the first place, the fact that the operators had been for fully two months predicting daily the end of the strike. They overlook, in the second place, the fact that under the Pennsylvania law the entire body of available mine workers was with the strikers.

It was claimed by the mine operators that only about one-half of the laborers in the coal region were members of the organization which, under Mr. Mitchell's leadership, ordered the strike; that the other half were either members of local unions or non-union men. The highest estimate which the operators made of the number of persons whom they were able to induce

to work while the strike was in progress was 17,000. Under the Pennsylvania law, no person can be employed as a miner in the anthracite mines until he has passed an examination by a state board created for the purpose and has received a certificate or license. One of the conditions of such license is "not less than two years' practical experience as a mine laborer" in the anthracite fields. It was this requirement which most seriously hampered the operators in their efforts to work the mines without the aid of the strikers, for men brought from other sections could be employed only in violation of the law. The strikers claimed that they controlled ninety-five per cent. of all the licensed workers, and this was probably true. While the commission was in session I asked one of the regular counsel of the operators if it was not true that, if the operators had been given ample military protection to prevent all intimidation and violence on the part of the strikers toward the non-union men who were willing to work, they would still have been unable, because of the license law, to obtain a force of miners sufficient to produce a supply of coal anything like adequate to the winter's demands. He replied that it was true. That was an admission that Mitchell was master of the situation and that unless the President had intervened there would have been, if not a famine of coal, a scarcity so serious as to cause suffering and probable riots in the large cities.

One of the most interesting aspects of the President's commission for final adjudication of the questions at issue between the operators and their employees was the principle of arbitration embodied in it. This was a very different principle from the one insisted upon by Mr. Mitchell at the outset of the struggle. It will be remembered that the Civic Federation, under the leadership of Senator Hanna, made an earnest and prolonged effort to settle the strike when it was first threatened in April. A conference between the conflicting parties was held, and although an armistice of thirty days was secured, failure ensued because the operators refused to recognize the union by consenting to an arbitration with it. In an arbitration of that kind the claims of non-union men would have no standing whatever, for there would simply be two parties to it, the operators and the union. Under the President's plan, the commission was to consider "all questions at issue between the respective companies and their employees," and it was especially stipulated that pending its findings all miners should return to work and all interference with and persecution of non-union men at present working

or hereafter employed should cease. It was also stipulated, and the stipulation was accepted by both parties, that when the commission should have reached its finding these "shall govern the conditions of employment between the respective companies and their employees for a term of at least three years."

The selections which the President made for members of the commission were in accordance with the spirit of his appeal. He chose them with the single object in view of getting a decision in accordance with right and justice. It was the unanimous opinion of the country that a more competent or more impartial tribunal could not have been constituted. It was in every way superior to the Civic Federation as an arbitrating body, for it contained no member who was identified directly with either party to the controversy. The Civic Federation was, furthermore, a self-constituted body and could only offer its services in labor controversies. It was not asked to arbitrate the coal strike, and it could not get the consent of the operators to such arbitration. The President's commission entered upon its duties under the high moral authority, if no other, of the highest officer in the land, and with the consent of both the contestants and their promise to accept its decrees. It sat for nearly five months, taking a great mass of testimony and agreeing unanimously upon a report that was a compromise, in which the strikers secured about half their demands, while failing to get a hearing upon their main contention, which was the recognition of their union by the mine operators. The use of intimidation and violence in support of the strike was strongly condemned, and for the settlement of future disputes a board of conciliation was proposed, to be made up of three members from each side, who could appeal to the circuit judge of the district to appoint an umpire whose decision should be final. The report was generally regarded as equitable, and both sides accepted it as they had pledged themselves in advance to do. Since the verdict was rendered there has been peace in the coal region. From time to time minor disputes have arisen but they have been settled easily under the terms of the agreement. The great results of the President's course were, therefore, an immediate resumption of mining, which supplied the country with coal and thus warded off suffering and disorder, and the establishment of peace in the region for three years. The indirect but scarcely less beneficent result was the beginning of a better understanding between operators and miners which every day of peace is developing and strengthening.

PANAMA REPUBLIC AND CANAL.

COURSE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

THE future historian, when he sits down to write the narrative of the establishment of the republic of Panama, will treat it as the culminating step in a movement that had been in progress for more than four hundred years. Viewed in that perspective, it is likely to appear a far less hasty proceeding than it seemed to be at the time it was effected. The final step was swift only when contemplated by itself. Considered in connection with the long and wearisome and annoying journey which had preceded it, the wonder is not that it was taken so quickly, but that human patience had delayed so long before taking it.

I shall endeavor, in making a record of it, to treat it as completely as possible in the light of history, for it has become historical fact. The new republic is established with the recognition of the United States and all the leading nations of the world, and the treaty by which the United States guarantees and pledges itself to maintain the independence of the republic of Panama was ratified in the Senate by a vote of sixty-six to fourteen, so many Democrats voting for it as to make approval of the Roosevelt administration's course virtually non-partisan, and hence popular. Instead of arguing the case for the government, I shall content myself with a statement of its reasons for the action which it took, citing these as its answer to the main points of the criticism which has been made against its course.

Did the Roosevelt administration act too quickly in recognizing the new republic?

In considering this question, both the President and the Secretary of State, according to their official explanations of their course, recalled the long history of the efforts of the American government to pierce the Isthmus with a canal. As early as 1528 a proposal was laid before the Emperor Charles V. for the opening of such a way across the Isthmus of Panama. From that day till 1904 the project continued to occupy a place among

the great enterprises yet to be accomplished. It remained unfulfilled only because the experience of four hundred years had demonstrated that private effort was wholly inadequate to the purpose, and that the work must be performed, if at all, under the auspices of a government of the largest resources. There was only one such government in a position to undertake it. By a well settled policy, in which all American nations are understood to concur, the assumption of the task by any of the great governments of Europe was pronounced to be inadmissible. Among American governments there was only one that seemed to be able to assume the burden and that was the government of the United States. To the accomplishment of this object that government had for years directed its diplomacy. It occupied a place in the instructions to our delegates to the Panama Congress during the administration of John Quincy Adams. It formed the subject of a resolution of the Senate in 1835, and of the House of Representatives in 1839. In 1846 its importance had become still more apparent by reason of the Mexican War, when a treaty was made with New Granada in regard to it. Four years later the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was entered into between this country and Great Britain. That treaty instead of furthering the project proved to be an insuperable bar to it. During the fifty-one years of its existence, nothing was done toward the construction of a canal. It became, almost immediately after ratification, the subject of bitter attack in this country because of its violation of the Monroe Doctrine, in allowing England and other European nations to share with us control of a canal, and because of England's alleged failure to comply with its conditions. From time to time, efforts were made to have the treaty denounced, or declared by us void because of England's failure to comply with its requirements, but the American government refused steadily to take this view, holding that we were bound in honor to abide by the treaty till England should consent to its abrogation. That consent was given, and in December, 1901, a new treaty was agreed upon, the main point of which is the complete withdrawal of Great Britain from partnership with the United States in the control of any canal that may be constructed. It was to be built with American money, and controlled by Americans, and its neutrality maintained by Americans. The United States secured power "to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder," but beyond that no express power is given to fortify it, while the language of the treaty

seems to amount to a prohibition in that direction. "The canal," it reads, "shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing the rules prescribed for the preservation of its neutrality, and shall never be blocked, nor shall any right of war be exercised, nor any act of hostility be committed within it."

The way now seemed clear for the construction of the canal. On January 22, 1902, the second Pan-American Conference, sitting at the City of Mexico, adopted the following resolution:—

"The Republics assembled at the International Conference of Mexico applaud the purpose of the United States government to construct an inter-oceanic canal, and acknowledge that this work will not only be worthy of the greatness of the American people, but also in the highest sense a work of civilization and to the greatest degree beneficial to the development of commerce between the American States and the other countries of the world."

Among the delegates who signed this resolution, which was adopted without dissent, was the delegate of Colombia. The next step was the decision of the United States in favor of the Panama route in preference to that of Nicaragua, and the passage of the Spooner Act in June, 1902, authorizing the President to acquire at a cost not exceeding forty million dollars the property and concession of the Panama Canal Company and to obtain from Colombia, on such terms as he deemed reasonable, control of the territory necessary for the canal. Therefore, negotiations were opened with Colombia, and in January, 1903, the Hay-Herran Treaty was agreed upon. This was ratified by the Senate and was sent to Colombia for approval by its government. While the treaty was in negotiation between the representatives of the United States and Colombia, objection was made by the Colombian government through its representatives to the first article, which provided: "The government of Colombia authorizes the new Panama Canal Company to sell and transfer to the United States its rights, privileges, properties, and concessions, as well as the Panama railroad and all the shares or part of the shares of that company." The Colombian government asked to have this modified so as to read that the permission accorded by Colombia in regard to canal and railway rights should "be regulated by previous special arrangement entered into by Colombia." This request the American government refused to grant, and it was abandoned by Colombia, whose representatives signed the treaty with the full authorization as it stands in the article, which is identical with that in the original draft of a treaty pre-

sented by Colombia itself through its minister to the American government in March, 1902. Some time after the treaty had been signed, the American government was surprised to learn that the Colombian government, in violation of this article, had sent notices to the canal company saying that further permission, in addition to that contained in the treaty, was necessary for the transfer of its concession and those of the railway company to the United States, and requiring the companies to cancel all obligations of Colombia to them, and thus destroy the rights, privileges, and concessions which Colombia by the treaty solemnly authorized the canal company to sell to the United States. That, if successful, would of course destroy the treaty by defeating its main purpose. This was one of many similar attacks, all instigated by the Colombian government, against the treaty which its representatives had signed, conduct which, as Secretary Hay has pointed out, is in violation of the familiar rule that "two governments, in agreeing to a treaty through their duly authorized representatives, bind themselves, pending its ratification, not only not to oppose its consummation, but also to do nothing in contravention of its terms." The attack which is believed to have been the main cause of the rejection of the treaty by the Colombian Congress was made in a report to the Colombian Senate by its canal committee, in which it was held that at the end of a year all the concessions granted by the government to the Panama Canal Company would lapse, and that then Colombia could take for itself the forty million dollars which the United States had agreed to pay the Panama Canal Company. After this the treaty was rejected and the congress adjourned.

WHY THE PRESIDENT WAS PROMPT.

It is the contention of the American government that Colombia's course in regard to the treaty showed conclusively the hopelessness of ever getting a satisfactory agreement from her. That was the conclusion of the people of Panama, for they made up their minds that in case the treaty was rejected they would revolt, and they made elaborate preparations, months in advance to do so, fully anticipating rejection.

This was the situation when the revolution took place on November 3, 1903. President Roosevelt had become so thoroughly convinced, when the treaty was rejected, that further efforts to reach agreement with Colombia on fair and equitable terms would be useless, that his intention was, he said in a sub-

sequent message, "to consult the congress as to whether under such circumstances it would not be proper to announce that the canal was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the terms that we had offered and no others; and that if such terms were not agreed to we would enter into an arrangement with Panama direct, or take what other steps were needful in order to begin the enterprise." In taking this position, he was acting in accordance with a sentiment expressed by Secretary Cass, in 1858, in the following official statement of the American government's attitude:—

"While the rights of sovereignty of the states occupying this region (Central America) should always be respected, we shall expect that these rights be exercised in a spirit befitting the occasion, and the wants and circumstances that have arisen. Sovereignty has its duties as well as its rights, and none of these local governments, even if administered with more regard to the just demands of other nations than they have been, would be permitted, in a spirit of eastern isolation, to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them, and that they choose to shut, or, what is almost equivalent, to encumber them with such unjust relations as would prevent their general use."

Forty-six years had passed since that opinion was expressed, and during that time no progress had been made toward beginning the construction of the canal. Finally, Colombia had placed herself in the pathway of progress in precisely the obstructive manner which Secretary Cass had declared would not be permitted. This was the final provocation, not only to the United States but to Panama. The latter rose in revolt and declared its independence, and the United States government recognized its independent existence as a republic immediately. In justification of such prompt action, the Roosevelt administration cited the condition of affairs on the Isthmus at the moment. Panama had been accumulating material for war for several months. The Isthmus was, according to the reports of trustworthy authorities, a perfect arsenal and its people were determined to make the most desperate resistance to the efforts of Colombia to subdue them. That Colombia was also prepared is shown by the fact that at the moment when independence was proclaimed, on the morning of November 3, she had a gunboat with between four and five hundred troops off Colon on the way to Panama. Secretary Hay, in his reply to General Reyes, thus defines the situation:—

"On the one hand stood the government of Colombia invoking in the name of the treaty of 1846 the aid of this government in its efforts to sup-

press the revolution; on the other hand stood the republic of Panama that had come into being in order that the great design of that treaty might not be forever frustrated, but might be fulfilled. The Isthmus was threatened with desolation by another civil war, nor were the rights and interests of the United States alone at stake; the interests of the whole civilized world were involved. The republic of Panama stood for those interests; the government of Colombia opposed them. Compelled to choose between these two alternatives, the government of the United States, in no wise responsible for the situation that had arisen, did not hesitate. It recognized the independence of the republic of Panama, and upon its judgment and action in the emergency the Powers of the world have set the seal of their approval."

That civil war would have begun immediately on November 3 but for the intervention of the United States, is proved by the official report of Commander Hubbard, of the United States gunboat, "Nashville," who had been ordered by the American government to Colon to protect the neutrality of the Isthmus along the line of the Panama Railway. The commanding officers of the Colombian troops had asked for transportation over the railway to Panama for their troops and it had been granted, but it was prohibited by Commander Hubbard as in violation of the perfect neutrality of the line of transit which the United States is bound to maintain. If Commander Hubbard had not been on the spot, the troops would have gone to Panama and civil war would have been begun on November fourth. The Colombian troops, after failing to get transportation to Panama, sought to occupy Colon on November fifth, in violation of an agreement between their commanding officers and Commander Hubbard. The latter, as soon as he learned of this intention, landed his full force of marines, only forty-two in number, for the avowed purpose of protecting the lives and property of American citizens if threatened, and by doing this and maintaining a cool and firm attitude in the presence of the Colombian troops when they entered the city, he prevented bloodshed and the beginning of civil war. President Roosevelt said on this point in his message of January 4, 1904:—

"Instead of there having been too much prevision by the American government for the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of American warships had been too long delayed; so long, in fact, that there were but forty-two marines and sailors available to land and protect the lives of American men and women * * * It clearly appears that the fact that there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was directly due,—and only due,—to the prompt and firm enforcement by the United States of its traditional policy."

If civil war had once begun, how long would it have lasted, and how wide would its complications have extended? In considering this question, the President and Secretary Hay had to judge the future in the light of the past. During the previous fifty-seven years, there had been on the Isthmus no less than fifty-three revolutions, almost one a year, some of them lasting for several years, and a recent one between Panama and Colombia extending over three years. In none of these had there been such provocation for revolt as the rejection of the treaty, or such formidable preparations for resistance. The people of Panama were convinced that their future as a community or state, financial and other, depended absolutely upon the construction of the canal. If that were built, a future of steadily increasing power and importance lay before them. If it were not built in their territory it would be built in Nicaragua, and the doom of the cities of Panama and Colon would be sounded, for even the Isthmian Railway would cease to be operated and Panama would fall into a speedy and hopeless decline. As one of the leading citizens of Panama said soon after the revolution :—

“ We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter of life or death to us. We wanted that because it meant, with the United States in control of it, peace and prosperity for us.

“ Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of in the way of revenues, she did not bridge for us a single river, nor make a single roadway, nor erect a single college where our children could be educated, nor do anything at all to advance our industries.”

Under these conditions, great provocation followed by unusual preparations for resistance, it was a reasonable supposition that civil war, once instituted, would last for several years. It was the avowed intention of Colombia to delay the whole question of a canal for a year in order to get into position to claim for herself the forty million dollars that had been promised by the United States to the Panama Canal Company. If, after a year of conflict, with the United States government constantly on guard to protect the neutrality of the Isthmus and to keep its line of transit open, Colombia had endeavored to enforce its contention that all rights and concessions to the canal company had lapsed and had reverted to herself, she would unquestionably have brought France into the conflict, for that government would be compelled to uphold the rights of its citizens who were stockholders in the canal company. Under these circumstances, it would have been very difficult for the United States to avoid being drawn into the conflict, if our government had used its

power to aid Colombia in suppressing the revolt, or had refrained from exerting its influence in the direction of peace by promptly recognizing the independence of Panama. It was a case of instant recognition, or a long and bloody conflict, with possible international complications. The Roosevelt administration, called to decide between these alternatives, decided for instant recognition. As President Roosevelt put it in his message of January 4, 1904:—

“Recognition by this government was based upon a state of facts in no way dependent for its justification upon our action in ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wish to deny, either the validity or the propriety of the general rule that a new state should not be recognized as independent till it has shown its ability to maintain its independence. This rule is derived from the principle of non-intervention, and as a corollary of that principle has generally been observed by the United States. But, like the principle from which it is deduced, the rule is subject to exceptions; and there are, in my opinion, clear and imperative reasons why a departure from it was justified and even required in the present instance. These reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; second, our national interests and safety; and, third, the interests of collective civilization.

“Instead of using our forces, as we were invited by Colombia to do, for the twofold purpose of defeating our own rights and interests and the interests of the civilized world, and of compelling the submission of the people of the Isthmus to those whom they regarded as oppressors, we shall, as in duty bound, keep the transit open, and prevent its invasion.”

COMPLICITY AND TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

Was there complicity between the American government, or any of its representatives, and the revolutionists?

On this point it is necessary only to cite the official utterances of the President and Secretary Hay. In his message of January 4, 1904, the President said:—

“I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which have been made of complicity by this government in the revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as destitute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self-respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one connected with this government had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of our military and naval officers, given above, no one connected with this government had any previous knowledge of the revolution except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs.”

In his reply of January 5 to the formal statement of Colombia's grievances which General Reyes made to him on December 23, Secretary Hay said:—

“The press in this country is entirely free and as a necessary consequence represents substantially every phase of human activity, interest, and disposition. Not only is the course of the government in all matters subject to daily comment, but the motives of public men are as freely discussed as their acts; and if, as sometimes happens, criticism proceeds to the point of calumny, the evil is left to work its own cure. Diplomatic representatives, however, are not supposed to seek in such sources material for arguments, much less for grave accusations. Any charge that this government, or any responsible member of it, held intercourse, whether official or unofficial, with agents of revolution in Colombia, is utterly without justification.

“Equally so is the insinuation that any action of this government prior to the revolution in Panama was the result of complicity with the plans of the revolutionists. The department sees fit to make these denials, and it makes them finally.”

Were our treaty obligations violated in refusing to aid Colombia to put down the revolution?

It is not only contended but proved by the supporters of the government's conduct, that under the treaty of 1846 the United States was bound to aid Colombia in maintaining her sovereignty only in case an effort were made to attach Panama to a foreign power. Citations from official records show a continuous line of interpretation by our secretaries of state from 1865 to the present time in accord with this dispatch from Secretary Seward to the American minister at Bogota:—

“November 9, 1865.

“SIR:—The question which has recently arisen under the thirty-fifth article of the treaty with New Granada, as to the obligation of this government to comply with a requisition of the President of the United States of Colombia for a force to protect the Isthmus of Panama from invasion by a body of insurgents of that country, has been submitted to the consideration of the Attorney-General. His opinion is that neither the text nor the spirit of the stipulation in that article, by which the United States engages to preserve the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama, imposes an obligation on this government to comply with a requisition like that referred to. The purpose of the stipulation was to guarantee the Isthmus against seizure or invasion by a foreign power only. It could not have been contemplated that we were to become a party to any civil war in that country by defending the Isthmus against another party. As it may be presumed, however, that our object in entering into such a stipulation was to secure the freedom of transit across the Isthmus if that freedom should be endangered or obstructed, the employment of force on our part to prevent this would be a question of grave expediency to be determined by circumstances. The department is not aware that there is yet occasion for a decision upon this point.”

From the date of that dispatch to the present time this construction has been imposed upon the treaty of 1846 by every diplomatic agent and secretary of state in the American govern-

ment. Furthermore, the Colombian government has itself accepted the same construction, for Mr. Burton, in replying to Secretary Seward's dispatch in 1865, wrote that he had opened up this subject of the construction of the treaty of 1846 with the diplomatic agents and ministers of the Colombian government, and added:—

“The result has been that the Colombian government declares that it does not feel itself authorized by the treaty to require the aid of the United States for the suppression of an insurrection, rebellion, or other disturbance on the Isthmus on the part of the Colombian citizens; not even an invasion by another Colombian state, unless such movement be intended to detach the state of Panama from the Colombian union and to annex it to a foreign power. This would seem to leave the Isthmus free to declare itself independent of the United States of Colombia, without the fear of the forced intervention of the United States of America, provided such declaration be not accompanied by the end of annexation to a foreign power.”

That was the situation in 1846, as interpreted about twenty years later. The question was a very different one in 1903. The railway which was constructed from ocean to ocean by American capital has thirty-two stations, and at each of these there is a group of population. At one end is Colon with a population of fourteen thousand, and at the other is Panama with a population of twenty thousand. There are warehouses, storehouses, stations, yards, and cars and other property belonging to the railway company scattered along the road's length. In addition are the dredges and machinery of the canal company, which the Canal Commission estimated as worth one million dollars. The American government must consider, when confronted with the question of interrupting transit on the Isthmus, not its obligations merely under the treaty of 1846, but its inherent right to safeguard the great interests and right of American capital invested there. When Colombia sought to use the railway in order to institute civil war, she herself violated the treaty, for civil war would have closed the Isthmus and made necessary American intervention to reopen traffic and keep it open.

COLOMBIA'S USURPING GOVERNMENT.

Was there a constitutional government in Colombia at the time of the Panama revolution?

On this point I shall follow the argument of ex-Secretary Root in his speech in Chicago on February 23, 1904. He claimed

that Panama retained an independent sovereignty as a state first in the republic of New Granada and later in the republic of Colombia, quoting from the different constitutions of those confederations to show that for nearly fifty years Panama "has never voluntarily surrendered her sovereignty." When the new constitution of Colombia was adopted in 1863, Mr. King, the American minister at Bogota, reported to the Secretary of State at Washington that under it "the states comprising the union were vested with absolute and unqualified sovereignty. From them emanated all authority, and without their assent none could be exercised by the federal functionaries of the nation." Under that constitution Panama lived as a sovereign state in coöperation with the other states of Colombia for twenty-three years. In 1885 Rafael Nunez became president. He undertook to govern in disregard of constitutional limitations, and was resisted in many parts of the republic, including Panama. He overcame the resistance and then declared that the "constitution of 1863 no longer exists." He put Panama under martial law and appointed a governor for it and for the other states. He then directed these governors to appoint delegates to a constitutional convention, and these delegates framed the constitution of 1886. The two delegates who represented Panama had never set foot in that state. The new constitution was adopted without compliance with a single one of the requisites prescribed by the constitution of 1863 for its amendment. It robbed the people of Panama of every vestige of self-government. It gave them a governor to be appointed at Bogota, and he in turn appointed all his subordinate administrative officers. The new constitution was never submitted to the people of Panama for approval or rejection. Mr. Root said of the situation at and subsequent to this subjugation: "The people of Panama fought to exhaustion in 1885 to prevent the loss of their liberty, and they were defeated through the action of the naval forces of the United States. Three times since then they have risen in rebellion against their oppressors. In 1895 they arose and were suppressed by force; in 1899 they arose again and for three years maintained a war for liberation, which ended in 1902 through the interposition of the United States by armed force. The rising of November, 1903, was the fourth attempt of this people to regain the rights of which they had been deprived by the usurpation of Nunez."

In 1898 M. A. Sanclamente was elected president, and J. M. Maroquin vice-president, of the republic of Colombia. On July

31, 1900, the vice-president, Maroquin, executed a "coup d'état" by seizing the person of the president, Sanclemente, and imprisoning him at a place a few miles outside of Bogota. Maroquin thereupon declared himself possessed of the executive power because of the absence of the president. He then issued a decree that public order was disturbed, and, upon that ground, assumed to himself legislative power under another provision of the constitution. Thenceforth, Maroquin, without the aid of any legislative body, ruled as the supreme executive; legislative, civil, and military authority in the so-called republic of Colombia. The absence of Sanclemente from the capital became permanent by his death in prison in the year 1902. When the people of Panama declared their independence in November, 1903, no congress had sat in Colombia since the year 1898, except the special congress called by Maroquin to reject the canal treaty, and which did reject it by a unanimous vote, and adjourned without legislating on any other subject. The constitution of 1886 had taken away from Panama the power of self-government and vested it in Colombia. The *coup d'état* of Maroquin took away from Colombia herself the power of government and vested it in an irresponsible dictator.

After the revolution of Panama, General Reyes, in behalf of the Colombian government, made an offer to the American government, through the American minister, to ratify the treaty, either by calling the congress together again or by decree, thus admitting that constitutional government did not exist in Colombia. The question thus placed before the government of the United States then became not one of interest, said Mr. Root, for treaty and canal were secure, but a "question of right, a question of justice, a question of national conscience." The people of Panama were the real owners of the canal route. They had never parted with their title to it, but constituted the federal government its trustee. The trustee was faithless to the trust, had repudiated its obligations, and had seized with the strong hand of military power the rights which it was bound to protect. Mr. Root's conclusion is likely to be that of the American people:—

"The question for the United States was, Shall we take this treaty from the true owner, or shall we take it from the faithless trustee, and for that purpose a third time put back the yoke of foreign domination upon the neck of Panama by the request of that government which has tried to play toward us the part of the highwayman? By all the principles of justice among men and among nations that we have learned from our fathers, and all peoples and all governments should maintain, the revolu-

tionists in Panama were right, the people of Panama were entitled to be free again, the Isthmus was theirs, and they were entitled to govern it, and it would have been a shameful thing for the government of the United States to return them again to servitude."

Was the act of recognition justified by the interests of civilization ?

President Roosevelt firmly believed it was. He said in his message of January 4, 1904: "I confidently maintain that the recognition of the republic of Panama was an act justified by the interests of collective civilization. If ever a government could be said to have received a mandate from civilization to effect an object the accomplishment of which was demanded in the interest of mankind, the United States holds that position with regard to the inter-oceanic canal." The civilized world very promptly confirmed this view of our position as the mandatory of civilization when through fifteen of its governments, including those of the leading nations, it recognized the independence of the new republic. Putting all other considerations aside, it is easy to discern that the great force which moved not only the United States government but the governments of the civilized world as a body forward so unanimously in this matter, was self-interest in three forms. First, the self-interest of Panama, which compelled the revolution as the only method of escape from destruction. Second, self-interest of the United States, which demands a canal for its commerce and the development of its resources. Third, self-interest of civilization throughout the world. On this point,—that an isthmian canal free to the commerce of the world is an inestimable boon to all mankind,—there is no dissenting voice. By rejecting the new treaty, for the reasons given and in the manner followed, Colombia put herself athwart the pathway of the progress of the world, and the world united to brush her aside. Then, too, there was that sympathy with Panama which always goes forth to a people striving to rid themselves of oppression. As Vattel says: "When a people for good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties."

OUR WORK AS A CIVILIZER.

I REMEMBER hearing an astute observer, who had made a lifelong study of American politics and character, say, after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, "Well, that starts us as a nation on a new and disastrous career. We are to go into the business of colonization, and no people were ever more utterly unfit for such work than we are. Our colonial administration will be saturated with spoils politics and be directed by spoils politicians. We shall make a dreadful mess of it, disgracing ourselves in the eyes of the civilized world." Never did prediction fail more completely of fulfillment than this has failed. Precisely the opposite has happened. We have shown that we are exceptionally fit for the work of colonization, we have kept spoils politics and spoils politicians out of the work entirely, and we have honored ourselves in the eyes of the world by the way in which we have performed it. For this highly creditable achievement the nation is indebted primarily to President McKinley. He made it not only possible but certain when he selected as pioneers in this new field of American endeavor such men as Generals Ludlow and Wood for Cuba, Judge Taft for the Philippines, and Mr. Allen for Porto Rico. Of each of these men it can be said, as President Roosevelt said so finely of General Wood in his Harvard commencement address in 1902, "credit to him! Yes, in a way. In another no particular credit, because he was built so that he could do nothing else." If President McKinley had done his country no other service than to select these men for this new task he would have earned the lasting gratitude of the American people, for it was a service that not only brought honor to his country, but advanced the cause of civilization throughout the world. This is not panegyric, but the simple language of fact, as a plain statement of what these men have done within three years will demonstrate.

THE NEW REPUBLIC OF CUBA.

The story of what was done in Cuba, before it was turned over to its people for self-government, reads like a romance. General Wood, in his admirable account of his work in the island,

which he gave before the Williams College alumni in 1902, said that the only instructions which President McKinley gave him when he asked him to go to Cuba were: "I want you to go down there to get the people ready for a republican form of government, I leave the details of procedure to you. Give them a good school system; try to straighten out their courts, and put them on their feet as best you can. We want to do all we can for them, and we want to get ready to get out of the island as soon as we can safely do so." Could the work of helping a people, just relieved from centuries of oppression, to start forward in the path of civilization have been outlined more simply or more wisely or more magnanimously than that? General Wood carried out his instructions in the spirit in which they were given, and the bare account of what he succeeded in doing reads like a tale from the "Arabian Nights"; like a summary of results achieved through the use of an Aladdin's lamp or of a magic wand. He found the island without a government, without either a school or a court system worthy of the name, and in a condition of filth which made the cities of Havana and Santiago the most unhealthy in the world. Within less than four years later, he left the island with an established form of republican government, under a constitution modeled closely upon that of the United States, with a comprehensive, intelligent, and upright court system, with a public school system that extended through all the provinces, and with a system of sanitation that had made the cities as healthy as any in the world, and had freed the island from contagious diseases, including yellow fever, for the first time in its history. When Santiago surrendered, its condition from a sanitary point of view was beyond description. Its death-rate was 300 a day in a population of 40,000. In one province there were 3,000 cases of smallpox, and in one hospital 1,200 victims. When General Wood left Cuba, less than four years later, the death-rate was on a line with that of New England, and the cities of Havana and Santiago had a cleaner bill of health than the city of Washington. Millions of dollars had been spent in the work of sanitation, and the incalculably valuable discovery had been made of the variety of mosquito that transmitted the germs of yellow fever. As far back as 1881 an old Cuban physician, Dr. Finlay, advanced the theory that yellow fever is transmitted by mosquitoes, but never found the particular variety of mosquito that produced the infection. After the American government began the reconstruction of Cuba, different methods were tried for the extermination of yellow fever. First came

the experiments with corrosive sublimate, then the successful campaigns against the mosquito. The yellow fever commission was formed, which made heroes of its three members and a martyr of one. The discovery that yellow fever cannot be transmitted by contact, but by the sting of a mosquito, General Wood says, was worth the whole cost of the war, and is the most important discovery in medical science since that of vaccination.

In his work of establishing a school system General Wood proceeded with equal energy and good judgment. He found almost enough prisons, military hospitals, and barracks in Cuba to make schoolhouses for the people. He found only one university on the island, and in each province a single institute or high school having many professors and few students. The public school was unknown. When he left Cuba there were 3,786 schools, with 4,000 teachers, and the yearly enrolment of pupils was 252,000, with a daily attendance of 140,000. Of the total revenue \$4,200,000, or twenty-five per cent., was spent for educational purposes. General Wood believes in the large school, and what he says of the one which he established in the old and indescribably filthy military barracks in Havana, shows what a genuine missionary spirit animated him in this field of his colonizing work: "We spent a great deal of money on this building in the plumbing and in all kinds of up-to-date sanitary arrangements. We spent it because I believe that a big school like that, in the center of a city of 300,000 people, most of whom are ignorant of the very principles of sanitation, with every sanitary improvement put into the building, will be much more valuable than any books we can give to the children. For this is an object lesson, and in going back to their homes the children will make demands for improved sanitary conditions." The Ohio school law was put into Spanish and adopted, and has been very successful, and to-day there is a uniform school system throughout the island of Cuba.

When, on May 20, 1902, General Wood turned the island over to President Palma and the new government, Cuba was free from debt and had a more promising political future than was enjoyed by any other Latin-American community. The people had received during these few years of American control an object lesson in government that was of the highest value. They had seen the transformation made from mediæval barbarism to modern civilization, and had acquired an elementary knowledge at least of the fundamental principles and methods of civilized government. They had seen that government established first

in the municipalities, then extended to the provinces, then embodied and formulated in a constitution for a republic. Many of them as members of municipal bodies, or as municipal officials, had acquired practical knowledge of the operation of government. We had, in short, done our full duty in starting them on the road that President McKinley marked out in his instructions to General Wood.

PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

What has been accomplished in the Philippines is, when the immensely greater obstacles encountered are considered, fully as notable as the result achieved in Cuba. There was no insurrection in Cuba, no opposition to American control, and the work of amelioration began immediately upon American possession. In the Philippines an organized insurrection began with the first moment of American possession and continued with varying degrees of activity for more than three years. During most of that time the islands were under military rule, and whatever civil government there was was merely a branch of the military. The military government called into requisition the services of military officers by detailing them to civil duties. Till July, 1901, the commanding general of the army in the islands was civil executive as well. Under his direction, and working in harmony with him, the Taft Commission began to lay the foundations of civil rule, seeking to place them firm and enduring in the principles of popular government. Slow but sure progress was made in this work, one province after another passing under control of civil rule, with a government in which their own leading men took a greater or less part according to varying local conditions, until in July of the present year the entire archipelago passed under civil rule, with Judge Taft as governor, and military rule was withdrawn. The islands were then at peace with the United States throughout their entire extent, and have remained so since. In a communication which he sent to the Senate at that time, Secretary Root gave the total amount expended by the American government in the islands as about \$170,000,000, and said of the military forces: "In the middle of the fiscal year ending June 20, 1901, there were about 70,000 American soldiers in the island. That number is now reduced to about 23,000. Orders have now been issued for the return of the Eighth, Fifteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry and a squadron of the Tenth Cavalry, and when these orders have been executed the

number of American troops in the Philippines will have been reduced to 18,000."

The bare recital of the results achieved by the Taft Commission up to the time of the establishment of supreme civil government is a really marvellous story. Provincial governments had been established in nearly all the provinces and municipal governments in nearly all the larger towns. A civil service law had been enacted, and for several years had been working admirably, which is a stricter application of the merit system than any similar law in the United States. Four million dollars had been appropriated for harbor and road improvements. A public school system, with 1,000 American teachers and 2,500 Filipino teachers, had been established and schools had been opened in 500 of the 900 towns in the island. In addition normal and manual training schools had been organized. There had been established a judiciary system, with a supreme court made up of three American and four Filipino judges, with appellate jurisdiction, and fifteen judicial district courts with general, civil, and criminal jurisdiction. A local police and insular constabulary force had been organized with 5,000 men, about 150 in each province, under inspectors partly American and partly Filipino, of which Governor Taft said in May last: "I am glad to say that thus far the operation of the constabulary system has been most satisfactory, and ladronism (brigandage) is rapidly disappearing. The selection of men for its ranks has been very carefully made. The system of selecting only residents of the province for service in the province avoids the danger of abuse and looting by the members of the constabulary themselves. In a force of some 5,000 men there have been reported but few desertions. The constabulary costs the Philippine government \$250 a man yearly, on the average." There had also been established a Health Department, coöperating with local health officials in all parts of the island, an Agricultural Bureau, Bureau of Mining, Bureau of Ethnology, a Bureau of Forestry, and a Postal System. Thus far the government had been self-supporting, its income being mostly from customs receipts. Surely this is a record of progress in less than two years which is a striking tribute to Governor Taft's ability as an administrator and to American capacity in the work of civilization and colonization. When it is added that on July 4, 1903, a proclamation was issued granting amnesty to all Filipino prisoners, including Aguinaldo, and that no outbreak of any kind has followed to disturb the peace of the islands, the record of pacification is seen to be complete, thus

opening the way to a rapid continuance of the civilizing work already so well begun.

In this genuine service to civilization Governor Taft was the leading force, the dominating influence, as distinctly as was General Wood in Cuba. President Roosevelt's estimate of his character and work, in his speech at Harvard, was as just as it was eloquent and generous. It has been my inestimable privilege to enjoy intimate personal friendship with Governor Taft since his appointment to the Philippines by President McKinley in the spring of 1900. I had many long talks with him on the eve of his departure to the islands, and there was perceptible in him then the awakening of that genuine missionary spirit which afterwards took complete possession of him. He told me then that he had been against the war with Spain, had believed it to be an unnecessary war, and regretted that it had left us with the Philippines on our hands. But the Treaty of Paris closed that part of the case. All there was for every American to do after that was to help his country to solve the new problems which the war had left on its hands. When President McKinley asked him to aid in this task, he felt that he had no right to refuse. He resigned his seat on the bench of the United States Circuit Court, although his tastes and ambition impelled him to a judicial career, and accepted the call of his country. I talked with him freely about his plans, and as I look back over his work in the islands I can see few or no really important particulars in which he has departed from them. His intellectual grasp of the problem had been so strong, his foresight so clear, that he was able to map out his work in all its largest details before he had started for the scene. This was especially the case in regard to the lands held by the friars, for the solution which he had in mind then is the one which he has brought to success now, and which he presented with such ability and tact at Rome as to command both the confidence and win the approval of the Pope and the authorities of the Catholic Church.

What the President said of him was based on personal knowledge of all this and of much more of the same character. He said he had, during Governor Taft's visit to this country, said to him that he was aware of his ambition to become a justice of the Supreme Court, but that if a vacancy were to occur then he did not see how he could possibly give it to him because the country needed him where he was; and that to this Governor Taft replied: "Mr. President, it has always been my dream to be in the Supreme Court; but if you should offer me a justiceship now

and at the same time Congress should take off entirely my salary as governor, I should go straight back to the Philippines nevertheless; for these people need me and expect me back and believe I won't desert them." Every one who met Governor Taft during that visit found him imbued with this spirit and concurred heartily with the estimate which the President made of him after his return: "He has gone back, gone as a strong friend among weaker friends to help them upward along the stony and difficult path of self-government; to do his part, and a great part, in making the American name a symbol of honor and of good faith in the Philippine Islands; to govern with justice and with that firmness, that absence of weakness, which is only another side of justice. He has gone back to do all that because it is his duty as he sees it. We are to be congratulated, we Americans, that we have a fellow American like Taft."

THE FRIARS' LANDS.

In no part of his great task in the Philippines has Governor Taft displayed higher ability than in that relating to the disposition of the lands held by the friars. He realized at the start that this was the crucial element in the problem, for unless the friars could be banished permanently from the islands there could be little real progress made in the direction of pacification and improvement. The one subject upon which all the Filipinos were united was that of hostility to the friars. This was based upon the political power which the friars exercised for fifty years previous to the battle of Manila Bay. As Governor Taft put it: "The friars were the policemen of Spain. They exercised absolute power in every municipality within their respective parishes, and they were made responsible by the people for every act of oppression, individual or general, which might be charged to the Spanish government." While the Filipinos of these parishes were Catholics and devoted to their Church, they would not tolerate these representatives of the Church any longer among them. The last insurrection against Spain, shortly before the battle of Manila, was caused largely by hatred of the friars, 50 of whom were killed in it, and 300 of whom were prisoners when the Americans took possession of Manila and released them. They owned in various provinces about 420,000 acres of land, some of which they had greatly improved by irrigation and other processes. After the insurrection, or for four years or more, the friars were unable to

collect any rents from the people occupying the lands, but under the Treaty of Paris they were lawful owners of the lands, were entitled to the use of them and the fruits of them, and if they were allowed to return and seek to enforce the rights of ownership the certain result would be riot and insurrection. What Governor Taft proposed was the purchase of the lands from them by the United States government and their sale in small holdings to the present tenants, on long and easy payments, the government to issue bonds in an amount sufficient for the purchase, and the proceeds of sales to go into a sinking fund for the redemption of the bonds. Congress authorized this proceeding, and in December, 1903, all the lands were bought for \$7,239,000, with the exception of about 10,000 acres that had been sold to a railway company. About three-fifths of the lands purchased are highly cultivated and thickly inhabited by thousands of tenants. In his final report as Civil Governor, previous to leaving the islands to assume the duties of Secretary of War at Washington, Mr. Taft said, in speaking of this transaction: "It is not thought that the income from the islands for several years will be enough to meet the actual outgo, but with a restoration of normal conditions—speaking for myself alone—I hope that the lands will sell for as much as we have paid for them. Other members of the Commission do not think so. It is to be noted, however, that the insular government has not entered upon the purchase of these lands with a view to a profitable investment, but that it is knowingly paying a considerable sum of money merely for the purpose of ridding the administration of the government in the islands of an issue dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the people of the islands.

"Following the policy which it was announced by the Vatican would be pursued, the bishops who were Spanish friars in all the dioceses of the islands have been allowed to resign and their places have been filled by American Catholic bishops. I cannot state with too much emphasis the satisfaction I feel in this change. It means, in my judgment, the beginning of a new era in the islands. It is to be expected that a large part of the people of the islands will continue to be communicants of the Roman Catholic Church, and it cannot but have a liberalizing effect upon them that their bishops shall be Americans with American ideas of a separation of church and state, and with the American respect for individual rights and individual liberties."

It may be well, in order to complete the record, to cite what President McKinley said to Judge Taft, when he selected him

to go to the Philippines. It is very like in tone and temper to what he said to General Wood. In his speech at a banquet which was given in his honor by his fellow citizens of Cincinnati, after his appointment, Judge Taft said: "The high and patriotic purpose of the President in the present juncture is to give to the people of the Philippine Islands the best civil government which he can provide, with the largest measure of self-government consistent with stability. He seeks only the welfare of the Filipino and the betterment of his condition." Speaking for him at the same time, Judge Taft said: "The problems seem certainly formidable enough. It will take patience, persistence, and tact to work them out. Doubtless we shall make mistakes which will deserve criticism, but if we maintain our purpose steadfast, to do nothing save for the good of the Filipino people, we hope, in spite of their formidable character, to surmount the obstacles and win success. If we can thus relieve a hitherto unfortunate and oppressed people from the evil of three centuries of misgovernment the end will be worth the struggle." In his formal instructions to the Taft Commission, President McKinley said: "A high and sacred obligation rests upon the government of the United States to give protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their country."

A few months later, in his letter accepting a renomination, President McKinley said: "It is our purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants, and to prepare them for self-government, and to give them self-government when they are ready for it, and as rapidly as they are ready for it." It is because these instructions have been carried forward in letter and in spirit that the work which we are doing in the Philippines is a great service to the civilization of the world.

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